Public perceptions of security dynamics and stabilisation interventions in the Niger Delta
August 2019 – January 2020
SDN supports those affected by the extractives industry and weak governance. We work with communities and engage with governments, companies and other stakeholders to ensure the promotion and protection of human rights, including the right to a healthy environment. Our work currently focuses on the Niger Delta.

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Summary

This report summarises the results of a public perception survey (PPS) carried out by Stakeholder Democracy Network (SDN) in three Niger Delta States – Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers. The purpose of the PPS is to understand local-level concerns about security in the region, and priorities for addressing security-related issues.

The PPS is conducted bi-annually, with each examining public perceptions relating to the previous six-month period. Due to the proximity to project completion in March, the survey for this report was brought forwards from March to January 2020, but participants were still asked to look back over the past six months, and forwards over the next twelve.

The major event during the period under review was the Bayelsa State gubernatorial election, which held in November and drew attention from across the region. In addition, the main Federal Government institutions tied to security and stabilisation in the Niger Delta came under increased scrutiny from the Government and the public. This was triggered by the Presidential announcement that the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) would be undergo a forensic audit.

Key Messages

- Overall, slightly more respondents thought the security situation had improved, rather than worsened, over the last six months. Optimism was particularly high in Bayelsa State following the November gubernatorial election. However, in Rivers State, almost half of all respondents thought the situation was worse, due to constant low-level insecurity.

- Public concern continues to grow over cult groups and their role in insecurity. Two thirds of respondents across states said that cult groups were most likely to be involved in security threats. This result is consistent with previous surveys, and the number of respondents ranking cult groups top is rising.

- Nearly two thirds of respondents in Bayelsa State were optimistic that the security situation would improve over the next year, reflecting hopes that the incoming Governor would have a positive effect. Conversely in Rivers State, following a series of killings across the state by unidentified gunmen, almost half thought it would worsen.

- By far the highest number of respondents said they think State governments should be responsible for improving security in the Niger Delta. This result is consistent with previous surveys, and the number of respondents ranking them top is rising. Respondents have consistently ranked Federal Government second across surveys, and this is rising too, meaning more respondents are assigning responsibility to these two over others, even those specifically established to address security and stabilisation in the region.

- The public visibility of the majority of Federal Government initiatives is diminishing. Consistent with past surveys, the only well-known initiative was the Presidential Amnesty Programme. For all other initiatives, awareness has dropped throughout the period of these surveys, which implies the public are increasingly apathetic towards Federal Government policy.

- Mirroring responses in earlier surveys, the highest number of respondents chose employment as the main priority area, relating to the common perception that higher unemployment leads to higher crime, cultism, gang-related violence, and insecurity.
• Only one fifth of respondents had heard of the Pan Niger Delta Forum, and even fewer understood what their objectives are, and this is down from one third in the last survey. Results suggest they have almost faded out of public consciousness in Bayelsa State, where just 3% had heard of PANDEF.

• In this survey, in light of developments with the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), we asked respondents about NNDC projects in their area. Overall, 80% of respondents said they had a Niger Delta Development Commission project in their community. Out of this number, half said the project was completed. This may seem low, but is higher than the 38% completion rate NDDC rates themselves. Between states, it would appear more projects are abandoned in Bayelsa. Overall, more than two thirds of respondents affirmed that the forensic audit would improve performance in service delivery.

If you’re interested in stability and security in the Niger Delta, be sure to check out our related resources here: www.stakeholderdemocracy.org/resources/
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1. Introduction

For over 15 years, SDN has worked with communities and stakeholders in the Niger Delta, tackling issues related to the impact of the oil and gas sector on the region. During this time, we have investigated security issues in the region relating to political unrest—in particular, around elections, extrajudicial use of force by the security services, militancy (including attacks on the extractives sector), cultism, and kidnapping.

In 2017, we began monitoring the security situation in communities through administering a bi-annual public perception survey (PPS), in an attempt to raise awareness of the concerns and priorities of those living in the Niger Delta.

This survey was the sixth in the series, and was conducted in Bayelsa, Delta, and Rivers states in the Niger Delta, where most of SDN’s work is focused. 300 responses (100 per state) were gathered in January 2020. Participants were asked questions relating to the security situation in their state over the past six months, and their outlook.

The PPS is usually conducted bi-annually, but due to the proximity to project completion in March, the survey for this report was brought forward two months, from the scheduled date of March to January 2020. Nonetheless, when reviewing the past period, respondents were still asked for their perceptions of security and stabilisation over the previous six months, and the next twelve.

The major sources of insecurity during the period under review were centred around the Bayelsa State election, which drew in political and conflict actors from across the region, and escalating everyday armed incidents. Dynamics within the main Federal Government institutions tied to security and stabilisation in the Niger Delta also generated a lot of public debate.

The following pages present the information collected through the survey.1

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1 This report presents the views of a sample of the public across the study area. Efforts were made to ensure respondents came from a variety of backgrounds, but the sample is not statistically representative. However, focus group discussions with key experts have been used to provide an additional level of confidence in the validity of the findings and, in this regard, the surveys provide a valuable indication into citizens’ perceptions across the focal states. Further details are in the methodology (Section 4).
2. Contextual dynamics in the survey period

The major sources of insecurity during the period under review were centred around the Bayelsa State election, which drew in political and conflict actors from across the region, and dynamics within the main Federal Government institutions tied to security and stabilisation in the Niger Delta.

Bayelsa off-cycle Gubernatorial election

Unlike previous elections, in the period immediately before the 16th November election, there were very few outbreaks of violence. Nonetheless, tensions were building as preparations were underway, including an escalated presence of security services, and heightened screening of travellers into and around the State in the weeks before the polls. This drew in a range of ‘violence entrepreneurs’ from across the Niger Delta, who sold their services to politicians on both sides.

On election day there was an uneven battle between the All Progressives Congress (APC) who rule at the Federal Level, and could therefore mobilise more financial and security resources, and the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), who ruled at the State level. Observation reports show there were significantly more clashes than reported in the media, often at the collation centres, which affected the results announced for whole wards. In some Local Government Areas (LGAs) there was extensive interference in voting, including hijacking of ballots and replacement of results sheets.

The APC were announced winners in a historic victory—the first in a Niger Delta state since democracy begun in 1999. After some minor protests, there was very little reprisal from opposition supporters for the remainder of the post-election period under review, as most turned attention towards clamouring to fit into the incoming administration.

Federal Government institutions tied to security and stabilisation under scrutiny

*Hydrocarbon Pollution Remediation Project* (HYPREP) is the agency tasked with the environmental clean-up of Ogoni land in Rivers State—a Federal Government project that is central to security and stabilisation in the region—and came under increasing public scrutiny towards the end of 2019. Civil society groups and activists issued a number of statements and interviews in media that questioned the technical capacity of the companies hired to do the work. Investigations by the *Premium Times* reported that the consultancies for communications and public relations were awarded to unqualified companies, who evidently had done very little work, which further compounded pressure.

**Niger Delta Development Commission:** After a meeting with the State Governors from across the Niger Delta in October, President Buhari directed an independent audit of the NDDC to verify delivery of projects and

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expenditure throughout the lifetime of the Commission (2001–2019). An interim committee was established to facilitate the audit, which triggered a number of threats from militant groups in the region, who demanded the new governing board, which had been approved by President Buhari earlier in October, be appointed to their positions. A number of accusations and counter accusations of corruption were generated in public debate, surrounding the administration of the largest spending government body in the Niger Delta.

Presidential Amnesty Programme: The former coordinator of the programme, Brig. Gen. (rtd) Paul Boroh, was arraigned by the EFCC over an alleged N1.5 billion fraud in October.1 This was followed by accusations against the serving coordinator, Prof. Charles Dokobu. Things were worsened by delays in payments to beneficiaries, public statements telling them to prepare for the programme to end, and resulting protests.2 This raised questions over the operation and efficacy of the institution with the most direct connection to security and stabilisation in the region.

Police conduct under spotlight

Since December 2019, the Nigerian Police Force has been under scrutiny following reports of the death in detention of a mechanic, Chima Ikwunado, and the torture of his four colleagues, after they were arrested at a checkpoint in Port Harcourt.3 A police spokesman in Rivers State announced that the late Chima died of high blood sugar—a claim which the mutilated corpse of the deceased appeared to contradict. This led to a revival of public discussion over daily abuse of power by the police, which was lively earlier in the year as the public used social media to share experiences of police misconduct.

Quantitative Conflict Data

The data displayed in Fig. 1 is from the Partners for Peace (P4P) peace map.4 It shows all incidents recorded under the conflict indicator categories in the target three states, for the survey period (October 2019–January 2020), and also for the six months before and after.5 This is provided to compare one source of data tracking reports of conflict incidents with the perception of the level of conflict, as experienced by the public.

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5 Conflict indicators are human rights, demographic pressures, insecurity, economic pressures, group grievance/collective violence, governance/legitimacy, public services, and refugees/IDPs.
During the period under review, the data shows a clear spike of incidents recorded in Bayelsa State, which are linked to the Gubernatorial election in November, as outlined above. In parallel, there is a dip for both Rivers and Delta states to the lowest levels in a one-year period. The precise reasons for this are not known. One possibility is the fact that conflict actors do act between states, and may therefore have been drawn into Bayelsa for the elections. Another possibility is that eight months after the election, any post-election activity that aggravated insecurity was petering out. As can be seen in Fig. 1 this did not last long, as incidents started to rise again into the new year.

Fig. 1. Conflict incidents recorded in the target states during the period April 2019—June 2020

1 P4P (2020)
3. Findings

This section presents the findings of the sixth PPS. The data is based on responses from a total of 300 people, 100 selected from each state, 50% female, 50% urban and 50% rural. (See section 4. Methodology for further information).

3.1 Perceptions of the current security situation

3.1.1 Changes to the security situation over the last six months

Participants were asked to describe the security situation in their state in January 2020 compared with six months previously (August 2019). Fig 2. presents their answers.

![Bar chart showing percentage of survey participants in each state selecting from available options on the perception of the security situation in their state.]

**Fig. 2: Percentage of survey participants in each state selecting from available options on the perception of the security situation in their state**

Overall, slightly more respondents thought that the security situation was better (37%), than worse (30%), in January 2020 compared to August 2019. However, there are some significant differences between states. For example, in Bayelsa State almost half of all respondents thought the situation was better (46%), while less than a fifth thought it had worsened (18%). This is likely because the Gubernatorial election had ended, and the vast majority had accepted the winning candidate (David Lyon), so there was very little post-election violence, relieving the tension of expectation.

Conversely, in Rivers State, almost half of all respondents thought the situation was worse (44%), while only a quarter thought it had improved (24%). In the previous survey, when asked the same question, a similar proportion (45%) thought the situation had improved, likely due to the end of the election period in the State. However, this time around, there were no major events in the state during the period, and the P4P data indicates the number of incidents reached the lowest point all year. This result is an indicator that the general
low-level insecurity, which may not always be reported or recorded, takes its toll. This is compounded when the security services set up to protect the public are involved in unjust scenarios that all citizens can relate to with personal experiences.

3.1.2 Security threats in the last six months

Participants were asked to state which actors they believed were most likely to be involved in security threats in their state. Fig.3. presents their answers.

Fig. 3: Percentage of survey participants selecting one response between given options on actors who they believe were most likely to be involved in security threats between August 2019–January 2020.

The highest number of respondents (67% overall) said that cult groups were most likely to be involved in security threats. This reiterates responses from all previous PPS surveys, highlighting the threat they pose to security and stabilisation across the Niger Delta. In the previous survey, just over half of all respondents (55%) labelled cult groups as the biggest threat—and this has increased to more than two thirds (66%) for the period under review.

Compared to the previous survey, therefore, attribution to cult groups rose in each state - in Bayelsa from two thirds to three quarters of respondents (67% to 75%), in Rivers from over half to over two thirds (53% to 68%), and in Delta from just under to just over half of all respondents (44% to 57%). The rise is interesting because cult groups are often employed by politicians during elections to challenge security, but the results across states indicate that the public in Rivers and Delta States felt they are more responsible for insecurity after elections.

One reason could be that the survey was conducted following the Christmas period, which every year witnesses a spike in crime, due to the motivation to make quick money, and also the increased vulnerability of citizens travelling on the road (people usually travel to stay with family, or back to their village for the period).
Over time, cult groups have become increasingly involved in armed robbery and kidnapping, so the crime of the period could be attributed to them.

The other high-ranking category of actors is organised crime groups, who are involved in similar crimes as cult groups, but do not operate under strict codes of conduct. This response was particularly high in Delta state, and increased to 37% of respondents from 16% in the previous survey. The State has a serious problem with internet fraudsters (known as Yahoo Boys), which many respondents may have been referring to here. The response also rose from 5% to 13% in Rivers State, where ‘organised crime group’ is more likely to refer to kidnapping rings. Similar to cult groups, the motivation and opportunity to make money over the Christmas period could be a cause for the rise in perception that organised criminal groups were responsible for insecurity.

3.1.3 Security situation over the next 12 months

Participants were asked to comment on what they think will happen to the security situation in their state over the next 12 months. Their answers are presented below in Fig.4.

![Fig. 4: Percentage of survey participants who thought the security situation in their state would get better, stay the same and get worse over the next 12 months.](image)

Overall, participants tended to think the security situation would get better over the next year. The respondents in Bayelsa were particularly optimistic, with nearly two thirds of respondents (62%) predicting it would get better, potentially reflecting their hopes that the incoming APC Governor David Lyon would be a positive influence on security and stabilisation in the State.

Conversely, in Rivers State nearly half of all respondents (48%) said the security situation would deteriorate over the next year, and just one quarter (26%) said it would improve. This pessimistic view of the upcoming year is a continuation of the view that the situation had got worse over the past six months (44%). This indicates that the public feel the security situation has been deteriorating for a while in Rivers State, and that on the current trajectory, is likely to get worse.
When pressed on why they thought things would worsen in Rivers State, participants raised the issue of increasing poverty. Indeed, Rivers State has the highest level of unemployment nationwide, and January is usually the hardest financial month worldwide following extra spending in December, on things like house rent (which tends to be paid annually in Nigeria), and luxuries over Christmas. There was very little awareness of Covid-19 across the three States, as this survey was conducted in January 2020 when reports were only just emerging from China, and this has since become one of the largest threats to livelihoods, security and stabilisation.

### 3.1.4 Actors responsible for security

Participants were asked to choose from a list of actors who they believed should be responsible for improving security in the Niger Delta. These results are presented in Fig.5.

![Fig.5: Percentage of survey participants selecting given options for who should be responsible for improving security in the Niger Delta](image)

By far the highest number of respondents overall (59%) said that they think State governments should be responsible for improving security in the Niger Delta. This has almost doubled since the last survey where less than one third answered this way (31%), but this was abnormally low compared to all past surveys, possibly due to the general elections where State governors were at the forefront of conflict dynamics (with actions having both good and bad influence on outcomes). In general, State governments have consistently been ranked highest by the public in these surveys, indicating the actual and potential roles they play in security and stabilisation.
Respondents placing responsibility with the Federal Government surged between surveys from 19% to 29%. This is perhaps a reflection of the sense that the security situation is gradually worsening, or at least not improving, and more substantial interventions with Federal backing are needed to break from the status quo.

In this survey, the vast majority of individual responses fell behind either the State or Federal government as the main actor responsible for improving security in the region (87%). All other categories dropped below their previous levels to less than 6% of respondents. This binary view indicates that other state and non-state institutions have a very small impact on improving the situation, and that widespread reform is needed to delegate responsibility and relieve pressure.

### 3.1.5 Federal Government initiatives to improve regional security

Survey participants were provided with a list of Federal Government initiatives, all of which aim to improve security in the Niger Delta, and were asked to select all of those that they were aware of. The responses are presented in Fig.6.

![Percentage of survey participants aware of Federal Government initiatives](Fig.6: Percentage of survey participants aware of Federal Government initiatives (provided as options) to improve security and stabilisation in the Niger Delta)
In all states, the Presidential Amnesty Programme (PAP) was by far the most well-known initiative by the Federal Government for improving security and stabilisation, especially in Bayelsa State (73%, compared to 39% in Delta and 70% in Rivers), possibly because a large number of ex-militants in per capita terms are registered in Bayelsa.

Interestingly, knowledge of all other interventions decreased when compared to the previous surveys. There was a dramatic drop in knowledge of the Ogoni clean-up (from 27% to 5% overall), particularly in Rivers State where the project is located (from 49% to 8%), and of the Nigerian Maritime University (from 25% to 16% overall), including in Delta State where the project is located (from 39% to 22%).

The huge drop across categories is unseen in previous surveys. The Federal Government did not communicate progress of these projects during the period, but this is not peculiar to the period, and has been a problem throughout implementation. Six years into the current administration, the public could be increasingly apathetic towards the Federal Government’s overtures towards the Niger Delta, and are learning to avoid staking too much interest in their policies.

Fig. 7 shows how effective respondents rated each of the initiatives they had heard of. Note that these percentages relate to different sample sizes, for example, only 11 had heard of the Niger Delta New Vision, compared to 214 who had heard of the PAP, so the fact that 55% thought the PAP was effective (118 people) is likely to be a more significant finding than 55% of respondents (6 people) thinking the Niger Delta New Vision is effective.

Overall, compared to the last survey, while the respondents who had heard of the initiatives were fewer in number, their perception about the effectiveness of the interventions was generally more favourable. For all initiatives, the percentage of respondents ranking them effective is above 30%, compared to the last survey where only the PAP was. A larger percentage of respondents felt the PAP was effective, and fewer felt it was ineffective (5% compared to 23% before). This is in spite of the fact that allegations of corruption were mounting against the head of the programme, and would be suspended in February and later fired.
Similarly, despite the Ogoni clean-up coming under intense scrutiny during the period for the poor performance of the contractors and the overseeing agency, more respondents felt it was effective at improving security and stabilisation, indicating that the scrutiny and publicity reinforces the purpose and importance of interventions. Since the overall number of individuals who were aware of the remaining initiatives is low, not enough weight can be attributed to the other results.

### 3.1.6 Priority interventions for improving regional security

Participants were asked to choose from a list of options that they thought should be the main government priority to improve security and stabilisation in the Niger Delta. Their answers are presented in Fig.8.

![Fig.8: Percentage of survey participants selecting given options on what they believe the main priority is for improving security and stabilisation in the Niger Delta.](image)

Mirroring responses in earlier public perception surveys, the highest number of respondents (49% across the three states) chose employment as the main priority area, up slightly from the last survey (45%), perhaps reflecting the increase in poverty noted earlier. This relates to the common perception that higher unemployment leads to higher crime, cultism and gang-related violence.

Responses asserting the need for investment in infrastructure increased significantly compared to the last survey (from 13% to 30%), especially in Rivers State (21% to 43%) and Delta (12% to 33%). In Rivers, the Governor had just announced that contracts for three flyovers were signed in Port Harcourt, some of the largest civil engineering works in years. Construction begun with the clearing of informal settlements of
traders, causing widespread disruption.1 Meanwhile in Delta State, the State government was undertaking works to improve old roads and build new ones across the State, including ones that are the responsibility of the Federal Government, for which they were openly demanding refunds.2

These projects could underscore why respondents thought infrastructure was increasingly important. Unfortunately, discussions on infrastructure often mean roads, and Governors are applauded for maintenance, let alone construction, at the expense of broader discussion on more adventurous infrastructure projects that would contribute towards improved economic and social activity.

3.2 The Pan Niger Delta Forum (PANDEF)

Following the last survey, this one included questions about the Pan Niger Delta Forum (PANDEF), an umbrella organisation which had been representing groups in the Niger Delta, including militant groups, in dialogue with the Federal Government since 2016.

First, respondents were asked whether they had heard of PANDEF, and overall, as is shown in fig.9, only one fifth had.3 This is down from one third in the last survey. Awareness is roughly the same in Delta State, but has decreased in Rivers State from half of respondents to one third, and in Bayelsa state, where awareness is almost zero (3%). This continual decline in awareness of the existence of PANDEF, let alone what they stand for, should be a cause for concern for the group, who base their existence on the fact they represent citizens of the Niger Delta.

![Fig. 9. Percentage of respondents who had heard of the civil society group PANDEF](image-url)

3 Note this is different to the previous question under 3.1.5 which asks if participants were aware of PANDEF’s dialogue with the Federal Government
3.3 The Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC)

Additional questions were added on the NDDC since it was under the spotlight following the President’s order for a forensic audit. The body has been allocated over N4 trillion since it was created in 2001, which is meant to be spent on large infrastructure projects across the nine Niger Delta states. It is therefore a very visible Government agency, and has a footprint in most areas. When respondents were asked if they had NDDC projects in their community, 80% said yes across the states. The majority of others didn’t know (15%), and just 6% said there was no project.

As the Commission was under fire for non-completion of projects and structural corruption, we asked respondents what the current status of the project was in their area, to generate an indication of their overall performance. The results are presented in Fig. 10.

![Fig. 10. Respondents reporting the current status NDDC project in their community by percentage](image)

Half of the respondents reported the NDDC project in their community was completed. This is higher than the number that NDDC itself reports on their online project portal, which states 38% of projects are completed, and that 35% are ongoing.1 The survey result is in line with other community reports, which find that progress was limited at around half of 133 NDDC funded projects in Rivers and Bayelsa states in late 2019. (add footnote to SDN NNDC report). The reason could be that a project appears completed to the public, yet certain milestones are yet to be met. It could also lie in corruption—if the NDDC classifies a project as not completed, it can continue to allocate resources.

Next we asked whether respondents thought the forensic audit would improve the performance of NDDC in relation to service delivery, and the results are presented in Fig. 11 below. Two thirds felt that it would, and this feeling was particularly strong in Delta State (86%) and Rivers State (72%), who also have the highest level of project completion. While very few details had been made public on who would conduct the audit, what it would examine, and what it attempted to achieve, this result illustrates strong public support for the process, which is believed to have potential to lead to measures that will ultimately improve service delivery.

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Fig. 11. Perception of respondents on whether the forensic audit of NDDC would improve performance in relation to service delivery

To find out about transparency initiatives and how that relates to NDDC’s project delivery, check out our report, *Oil money for development in Nigeria*, due out in October 2020.

Available:  
www.stakeholderdemocracy.org/resources
4. Methodology

This research encompassed three states in the Niger Delta: Rivers, Bayelsa and Delta. A survey was administered by the SDN research team in various locations, including communities and towns, split between rural and urban areas. Multistage sampling was used—including purposive (to ensure gender balance) and convenience sampling, with the research team approaching respondents on the street, in their homes, and at public locations.

The survey was administered over four days in August 2019. There were 300 respondents in total—100 drawn from 20 LGAs across nine senatorial districts in the three states of coverage. The LGAs selected were Akuku Toru, Asari-Toru, Etche, Ogu/Bolo, Obio/Akpor, Port Harcourt, Tai, Oyigbo, Ogbia, Sagbama, Southern Ijaw, Yenagoa, Udu, Ughelli North, Ethiope West, Warri South, Patani, Bomadi, Ndokwa East, and Ukwuani.

Respondents included people from a range of backgrounds, including apprentices, homemakers, NGO/local association workers, public servants, private sector workers, students, traders, the self-employed, and the unemployed.

One validation session was held in Port Harcourt following completion of initial analysis. Discussants included representatives from government, NGOs, faith-based organisations, the private sector, and traditional institutions.

A breakdown of survey respondents is below.

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