How Much Is Turbulence Ahead?

Despite collapsing international confidence in the short-term situation in the Niger Delta, some Nigerian government representatives and companies continue to pursue a public strategy of trying to minimise awareness of - and even deny the existence of - fundamental problems.

It is in the common interest of the population and international stakeholders in the Delta to do all they can to challenge this propaganda, which is essentially designed to defend the status quo. The unbalanced reaction of the Federal Government to a recent CNN story was partially driven by this problem. If this frittering away of energy on spin continues, there is a real possibility that the underlying issues that have created the crisis will not be addressed, and the conflict will rapidly escalate.

The sense of there being two Nigerias, co-existing in parallel versions of reality, is replicated on the international level too.

Consider, on the one hand, the views of Nigeria's instability held by the USA's most senior assessors of political risk. On 27th February 2007, the Director of US Intelligence Mike McConnell testified before the US Senate's panel considering world-wide national security risks. "The [Nigerian] government's institutional foundations are hollow from decades of neglect and corruption and will continue to make the country susceptible to recurring crises in coming years," McConnell told the panel, echoing the views of his predecessor a month earlier.

At the start of 2007, John Negroponte - the previous Director of National Intelligence - warned that Nigerian democracy is in danger, when giving testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee. [i] Negroponte gave a stark assessment of Nigeria's ability to transfer power peacefully from President Obasanjo to an elected successor. [ii] Negroponte told the committee that the Nigerian people were "increasingly demoralised from worsening living conditions" despite official figures which showed the country's economy improving, and that "major political unrest in Nigeria would threaten other countries in the region."

Giving separate testimony, Army Lieutenant General Michael D Maples, Director of the Defence Intelligence Agency said the potential for violence during the forthcoming elections remains high "as candidates from the predominantly Muslim north and Christian south compete for office." Maples told the committee that oil companies have warned that continued violence "may prompt them to curtail future operations" since Nigerian security forces have been unable to secure the region's vast oil infrastructure from militant attacks. [iii]

Compare these assessments with the business view of Nigeria's stability, typified by a recent Bloomberg report: "Until a year ago, Nigeria was off limits to many bondholders because of its failure to co operate with the Group of Seven nations' Financial Action Task Force tackling money laundering. Nigeria was among the three most corrupt countries in the world as recently as 2004, along with Bangladesh and Haiti, according to Transparency International in Berlin. 'Nigeria's ability to pay is huge and the willingness has improved a lot,' said Ram Melwani, who bought Guaranty Trust's bonds for the $100 million of assets he manages at Investment Services U.K. Ltd. in London. 'Nigeria is stable, and it's a good time to pick up a bit of yield.'" [iv]

This ability of investors to pull the wool over their own eyes has led to Standards and Poor giving Nigeria the same credit rating as Brazil.

Both major presidential candidates in Nigeria's forthcoming elections have at least tacitly acknowledged the seriousness of the situation in the Niger Delta, if not how it could affect the country and region as a whole. However, key constituencies of Nigeria's political elites still refuse to publicly admit that the analysis of violence in the Niger Delta as an occasional fluctuation is basically flawed.

Significant international pressure and clear thinking is required to force Nigerian politicians - who currently only react to the crisis in the Delta when the oil revenues on which they rely are drastically affected - to face reality. It is also, obviously, not in the interests of the local population, regional energy security or stability to test whether militant groups and disaffected communities have the capacity to further damage the Nigerian oil industry. A quarter of all production shut in should be enough of a warning of what could follow.

Both oil companies and the Federal Government appear to be dabbling with a response to the crisis that focuses on offshore production, and possibly even removing corporate structures to Lagos and Abuja. This might provide some very short-term relief. But militants - who have shown a creative capacity to reach inside oil companies' so called "secure" areas - would also probably regard such a proposed move as a challenge. Such a retreat would also be regarded as deeply cynical by communities and civil society, further strengthening sympathy for more radical approaches.

There is still much that can be done onshore to stabilise the situation in the Niger Delta. Acknowledgement by the government, oil companies, and donors that significant mistakes have been made in their faltering interventions over the past three years may be required. It is also important to note that local interest in governance and accountability has jumped dramatically, and should be shown support from outside the Delta as well as from within.

Immediate challenges for the international community include maintaining some engagement around elections in the Niger Delta when risks to foreign national are high. By supporting the democratic will of the people of the Niger Delta, and standing up to those politicians who use violence and vote rigging to gain electoral office, the international community will be supporting its own vital interests in the region.

Turning a blind eye - based on a misguided assessment of the importance of "democratic transition" - will further polarise Delta society, increase the impunity of political elites, lead to escalating violence, and further undermine local and international energy security.

A failure by Nigerian politicians and the international community to engage seriously in the Niger Delta between May and December 2007 could contribute to a severe intensification of the conflict. The conflict in the Niger Delta can only be resolved by tackling the root causes of violence. Opportunities to engage more effectively have been missed repeatedly since conflict risks became obvious in 2004. Lessons must be learnt from the consequences of those token responses.