Conflict Drivers

The main driver of conflict in the Niger Delta is the systematic failure of the Nigerian government to utilise the revenue generated through oil production for the good of the people.

The resultant poverty of the majority of the population is only dwarfed in seriousness by the excesses of the state elites. This disparity between the majority and minority is the direct result of endemic corruption, the 'chopping' of funds, that should have been used to benefit all. This visible disparity, thrust into the faces of the majority on a daily bases, is a very serious conflict escalator in itself.

The outcomes of this failing by the state is a long history of broken promises, and removal of the social contract between the state and the majority of its citizens in the Niger Delta. Reinforcing the demise of the social contract is the belief that politicians from outside the 'South-South' zone of Nigeria have developed Abuja – the capital - on the back of the oil wealth, while continuing to forget and - more importantly - not care about the fate of the Niger Delta. The wealth and potential for future revenue generation that exists in the Niger Delta is a worrying aspect to the conflict dynamic: the resources necessary to fund and sustain a high level conflict are readily available.

The population of the Niger Delta perceive that because they are not composed of a majority unifying ethnic group, they have been marginalised since independence. Their develop-mental needs, as originally highlighted by the Wilkins Commission at the end of the colonial era have never been addressed. Abandoned and subdued by successive military junctures it was hoped, but not expected, that democracy might finally deliver development to the population of the Niger Delta. However, little has changed and some commentators even suggest that things were better under military rule. It is generally believed that the current 13% derivation that the South-South states receive of the oil wealth is not enough to address the decades of neglect faced by the population of the Niger Delta and some feel as this is an insult. What is crucial here is that if this 13% was spent wisely and the governments at the state and local level no longer enriched themselves at the expense of the people, then this amount would go a long way in reversing the plight of the Delta.

It can be assumed with some confidence that the continued poverty of the Niger Delta is primarily due to the failings of the Nigerian state and this poverty is the key to the expected upsurge in violence. The violence rapidly developing in the Niger Delta is said to be a final cry for voice based on a well thought through argument that things have to change, people have simply had enough; they are pushed to the wall. This feeling of being pushed to the wall has resulted in individuals being drawn to support local ethnic and conservative groups as the majority reinforce their attachments to those in society to whom they feel the closest. This has resulted in a complex web of local conflict dynamics, that if ignited would be catastrophic for the Niger Delta. Just as the violence in the Niger Delta is primarily down to political failings and the resultant poverty, the answers to the conflict dynamic also exist within the state. However, there would need to be a dramatic reform of the political system which sees issues based politics become the norm if these answers are to be found.

It is widely recognised that the current and increased conflict dynamic, which is undermining the security of all stakeholders in the Niger Delta, stems from the violence associated with the 2003 general election. By all accounts, the 2003 democratic process was completely flawed in the Niger Delta. The People's Democratic Party (PDP) incumbents and prospective candidates mobilised and armed youth militias and state security services to gain an electoral result "via the barrel of the gun". The term 'democrazy' is commonly used to explain the current political situation in Nigeria. In the rare instance where individuals got the chance to vote in 2003, the electoral process was described as a "PDP selection not election".

This reality undermines the legitimacy of the state in the minds of its citizens, yet more worryingly sets a clear precedent that violence is a legitimate way to gain political power because there is impunity and no one has been prosecuted for election-related violence or rigging in 1999 and 2003 . Political office in the Niger Delta, at both the state and local government levels, is 'a winner takes all' situation. Therefore, individuals are willing to gain it at any cost. That cost in the run-up to the 2007 elections could take the form of hundreds, if not thousands of lives, let alone the widespread destruction of property and increase in poverty. The Niger Delta is rife with arms and loyalty formation as political, ethnic and militia based groups prepare to secure 'their lot' and prepare to fight for either themselves, or the highest bidder. The current situation in the Niger Delta is perhaps best described as 'the calm before a storm'.

Preparing to guard assets, without addressing the root-causes of this storm will be futile. As expressed time and again, "things have to change" and violence is perceived as the only option left open to achieve this. Associates of violence have the status and structures of support desired by all and only held by a few. The lack of social mobility outside of illegal channels is creating the self replicating belief that violence pays.