| The Triple Threat |
|
Page 10 of 11
4. Deliver wealth back to producer-communities
People in the Niger Delta need to see that democratic processes deliver economic development. The alternative to the politics of dialogue is the politics of the gun. The recent emphasis on engaging with identified members of militias - Asari and his immediate gangland rival Ateke Tom in particular - has fuelled a perception that government and international actors only respond to significant threats to the steady flow of petroleum, and that non-violent approaches are overlooked. In the short term, environmental clean-up operations conducted to international standards could create employment and assist a longer-term improvement in agricultural output. Additionally, fast tracking announcements of peace building initiatives and development interventions could act as a "soft barrier" to an immediate escalation of conflict. The intervention of external stakeholders in the Delta to publicly support these efforts could be decisive in ameliorating any possible escalation.
In the medium to long term, the flawed NDDC "master plan" is a basis for progress, despite its considerable drawbacks. There is a need for the NDDC to show clearly what funds it is receiving, how they are being applied, and whether theoretical "due process" rules for contracts are having any impact. The NDDC must also begin to show "value for money" in contracts, and face up to the problem of extraordinary contract inflation that it shares with oil company development programmes. All stakeholders - including oil companies - should support this, including by paying overdue contributions.
The idea has been floated by some activists that money saved through debt rescheduling should be paid directly into a ring-fenced "catch-up" fund for the Delta and the most deprived parts of Nigeria. Similar ideas have been discussed as part of the step beyond EITI, once greater transparency in terms of oil production and revenue has been achieved (the EITI does not - presently - extend to an examination of how oil money is spent) and in relation to reform of UK corporate taxation. (For example, some of Shell's tax in the UK could be paid directly into an internationally administered development fund. The Netherlands could be encouraged to follow this model, etc.)
Shell - arguably the biggest external stakeholder in the Delta - has come under sustained and considered criticism for its history of failed attempts to return wealth to the communities who's land it came from. [61] The oil-company has it in its power to send the Delta a positive signal by moving swiftly to undertake comprehensive reform of its community assistance program. A major step would be to establish an independent, arms-length body to run it's philanthropic activities. Additionally, Shell would achieve a lot more if it worked through independent organisations with expertise in the field of development rather than continuing with its own, faltering efforts "in-house." Other companies have mismanaged their community assistance and must establish independent means of distributing philanthropy to stop fuelling the culture of corruption and violence. [62] |
|
| Last Updated ( Thursday, 28 September 2006 ) |
