4 steps that must be taken to address the "triple threat"

1. Get the guns off the streets

The "buy back" price from the Rivers State government for small arms - mostly AK47s - has remained at around $1800 (between five and ten times the market price in other parts of West Africa) since Asari's "war" declaration in October 2004. This is a reflection of the buoyant market for weapons in the Niger Delta, and the revenue at the disposal of criminal networks and political groupings to arm their foot soldiers. It is important to understand that the influx of arms into the region has continued unabated since early 2003 at least, and that this is now a diffuse problem. The weapons are not in controlled armouries belonging to a few gangs but are much more widely dispersed: in anything from village armouries, to the hands of individuals who received weapons in the 2003 election cycle. (Many villages have developed small armouries as general level of armaments has increased. It is also apparently possible to hire AK47s by the hour in Port Harcourt.)

• Decommission weapons

There has been a limited number of decommissioning exercises but local human rights monitors are sceptical that these are anything more than PR exercises staged to reassure foreign investors and the Federal Government. Local observers have estimated that the few thousand guns melted down for the cameras is only a small fraction of the number of weapons now in circulation. A local human rights organisation has noted that the main decommissioning in December 2004 drew a disproportionate number of G3 Rifles (standard issue to the navy,) which was at variance with the weapons previously observed with militias. [51]

• Monitoring

Stronger external, independent monitoring of decommissioning exercises must be introduced. Concerns have been raised that elements of the police, military and security services are involved in arms trafficking. There is some evidence of "recycling" of weapons that should have been destroyed. In strengthening external monitoring, the considerable sensitivities of the Nigerian authorities to maintain the reputation of its police and military to protect Nigerian citizens must be borne in mind and respected.

• Provide viable alternatives to cash "buy backs"

Concerns have also been raised that a monetary "buy back" is simply fuelling purchase of newer, better weapons. Lessons must be learned from similar decommissioning exercises world-wide. In particular, the considerable problem of providing an effective alternative to cash payments requires an imaginative approach in an environment where the general populace has hardly any trust in the State government to provide even basic services, and with external Aid agencies reluctant to get involved. [52] (If a young militia member is asked to hand in a weapon he knows was worth $1800 for vouchers for college classes or health treatment, he must believe the vouchers will be redeemed. It is difficult to exaggerate how hard it will be to overcome public scepticism in this regard.)

• Arrest the arms dealers

Nigerian and international Law Enforcement agencies should act to stem the supply of weapons, and arrest the traffickers.

• The Niger Delta needs a UN Small Arms limitation treaty in force

The profusion of weapons in the Niger Delta illustrates the deficiencies of the 1998 arms moratorium agreed by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the need for an enforceable UN Treaty, which is now UK government policy. [53] The United States blocked a previous UN treaty. There is a powerful argument that backing a new treaty would be in America's self-interest as - at least in the case of the Niger Delta - it would protect US energy security and the goal of diversifying oil supplies outside the Persian gulf. [54]