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The Triple Threat
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The Triple Threat
Macro-factors:
Poverty
Corruption
Micro-factors:
Lack of basic rights
Activities of criminal networks
Political risks to business
4 steps to address the triple threat:
Get the guns off the streets
Remove the source of revenue
2007 elections
Deliver wealth back to communities
References


Activities of criminal networks

The money to buy the military hardware now in the hands of gangs, militias and political groups mainly comes from two sources.

Politically-motivated violence: powerful political figures used the gangs to rig the 2003 elections (and may also be involved in bunkering, arms dealing and other corrupt and criminal activities.) Having launched the gangs on their new, more violent, trajectory these senior politicians are having an extraordinarily difficult time controlling their creations while also retaining any political credibility. Gangs and militias are also involved in arms trafficking, money laundering, protection rackets and a variety of other activities. (Most of the 500+ deaths in the late Summer of 2004 were related to drive-by and "contract" killings, though there was also a strong element of political violence in many of these murders.) [45]

Bunkering: local parlance for the industrial-scale theft of oil from the spider's web of dilapidated oil pipes and wellheads strewn across the region. The scale of bunkering in the Niger Delta has been variously estimated by official sources at anywhere between 50,000 and 300,000 BPD (Barrels Per Day) at any given time. Some commentators have estimated bunkering throughout Nigeria - mostly concentrated in the Delta - amounts to a fifth or Nigeria's real production, worth as much as $2 - $3.6 billion in illegal business every year, which as an international criminal racket places it on a par with Colombian cocaine cartels. Unlike cocaine, trade in stolen oil is less obvious as a global illegal activity. [46]

These short sighted attempts to hold on to and expand personal patronage networks have increasingly eroded any faith the citizens of the Delta had in the democratic nation state and local government to meet their need for basic survival. This has resulted in the rise of militia gangs and a re-ethnicisation of politics.

Local feeling about the situation was expressed well in an editorial in a March 2005 Port Harcourt newspaper:

"Much as the military authorities have advised that punitive military assaults cannot secure peace, there is need for the government to be proactive in curbing the activities of criminal gangs who have made Nigeria's coastal waters to be most deadly and unsafe for international shipping. It is clear that the official palliative of setting up the Niger Delta Development Commission and massive military action are not enough guarantee for peace [...] The idle youths who have been dislocated by pollution and environmental degradation of land and rivers must be resettled and gainfully employed. More importantly, the security agencies should mop up the illicit arms, apprehend and deal decisively with the powerful masterminds and backers of these bands of hoodlums before they totally cripple the nation's main revenue source." [47]



Last Updated ( Thursday, 28 September 2006 )
 



 
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