Lack of basic rights

Despite the end of dictatorship and transition to democracy, a continuing lack of basic human rights - rights to freedom of expression, representation, from torture and extra-judicial killing, and in particular the right to economic development [35] - is the fundamental cause of the pervasive sense of instability throughout the region. The feeling of a general lack of security is acute in the oil-producing part of Nigeria. This is due to the recent gang-wars - subsequent military assaults on militia's bases and militia threats to oil industry infrastructure - in Rivers State; and the various, simmering conflicts - now almost a decade old - around Warri in neighbouring Delta State.

Nationally, though there are no immediate rumours or clear indications that a coup is on the cards, the spectre of dictatorship in Nigeria has still to be exorcised. This sense that the whole country may still yet face crises is best illustrated by the resignation of Audu Ogbeh, Chairman of the ruling PDP political party in Nigeria in January 2005. In an open letter Ogbeh cited the risk of a military coup if political conditions in the country continue to deteriorate. [36]

There are positive signs that both the Presidency is moving on key issues affecting the poorest in Nigeria, especially minorities in the Delta. This has been shown by President Obasanjo's support for the proposed Ogoni Reconciliation Process, and other small, positive steps like the (last minute) invitation of Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) President Ledum Mitee to take part in the recent National Political Reforms Conference. [37]

Without action and a radical change of approach at the State and local government level, time may be running out for the Niger Delta. Despite the apparent inactivity of the gangs who created the October 2004 crisis (in fact, gang land killings and activity have resumed slowly, though without grabbing international headlines) [38] there have been at least five incidents since October 2004. Clashes between gangs, military and security forces - in Ojobo, [39] Odioma, [40] Kula, [41] Escravos, [42] and in March 2005 Ahoada West [43] - have all led to a very significant loss of life. This continuing pattern of violence indicates that the State government - in all its forms - has yet to find new ways to address grievances of, and disputes between, oil-producing communities besides a lethal combination of police, military and militia force.

Additionally, the Agip waterside shanty town clearance in March 2005 shows how actions of State government - making more than 5000 homeless, with no prior warning or compensation - vary considerably from intentions of the Federal government, and add to a general sense of instability and threat to people's livelihoods. [44] This could just be the start of an escalation of the violence as the militias and their predatory political associates increasingly compete for domination of the void left by the retreat of the State. It seems likely this violence will escalate beyond the possibility of conflict prevention, and all instead stakeholders in the region will be facing the task of conflict resolution.