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You are here: > About SDN > What We Do > Good Governance > Delta State Election re-run - Observation
Delta State Election re-run - Observation
Key Points:
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Rushed Election held under difficult circumstances
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Incomplete Voter's register an obvious handicap
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Fair polling noted in limited areas covered by teams
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New voting method and local results declaration appear to be positive step
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Disparities over turnout and election incidents cast doubt over some LGAs
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Transparent follow up by INEC crucial to Delta and to 2011 polls
INTRODUCTION
SDN and CEHRD have opted to work together to provide a limited observer mission to the Delta State re-run on January 6th 2011.
The objectives of observation were limited by practical constraints – the election was only officially announced on December 22nd and resources available for the exercise were limited.
Therefore the focus of work by SDN and CEHRD was to focus on issues of violence while also making a limited assessment of steps taken by INEC to improve on previous elections. The method used was to arrange two small teams of observers and to draw information from volunteer observers established by CEHRD across the state.
The comments in this interim report are not intended to be comprehensive but we hope they will be useful to the planning of the 2011 elections.
ELECTION PREPARATION
The Delta re-run election was thrust on INEC at a difficult stage while it was preparing for the main 2011 elections. The Court of Appeal ruling that cancelled the 2007 election three years after it was held highlights many of the process problems associated with establishing fair elections in Nigeria.
INEC has repeatedly said it faces very difficult choices in holding the re-run, not least because it needed to use a 2007 voter's register that was at the core of the court ruling rejecting the previous result. The prospect of holding an election in a volatile state while also attempting to arrange voter registration nationally has also reportedly been at the core of tough choices.
The eventual decision to hold the election on January 6th was criticised by SDN and others. The announcement on December 22nd appeared to violate the 14 day (excluding public holidays) notice required for a poll and added further haste to a poll that could have been conducted in the first week of February with better preparation.
However once committed to the January 6th date INEC appears to have made significant efforts – including the symbolic move of co-opting Resident Electoral Commissioners from three neighbouring states. When SDN and CEHRD visited there were clearly intense preparations through the Christmas and New Year period.
INEC also clearly decided to work on reducing opportunity for electoral fraud by modifying regulations for voting – so that accreditation would occur over some hours (9am to 12pm officially) while voting would follow (12-3pm). This is most often referred to as modified open secret ballot and is locally known as a variation on 1990s “modified Option A4”. This will be commented on further in the observation but it is seen as a significant step in regards basic administration.
ELECTION DAY OBSERVATION
SDN and CEHRD observed in a number of LGAs surrounding the key oil town of Warri and the state capital Asaba.
Election Administration - voting
The distribution of election materials has been a perennial problem for INEC and this continued in what appeared to be most areas, although less severe than elections such as 2007. There appeared typically to be delays of 1 to 2 hours on advertised start times. However there were also persistent reports from places such as Burutu LGA, where credible local sources said that materials never appeared to leave the LGA headquarters and no voting took place.
In many places there appeared to be considerable interest and relatively orderly queuing but the actual turnout being far below the 500 per polling unit that is average across the state. Although unfamiliar there also appeared to be good co-operation with the style of voting and a reasonable pace that led to closure in many areas around 3pm or shortly afterwards.
Violence
Before the election INEC had pledged to work with security agencies to prevent violence and attacks on the polls and reportedly 22,000 members of police and security agencies were drafted into the state. This certainly appeared to have a positive effect in many areas but it did not eliminate serious problems.
Even with limited teams on the ground SDN and CEHRD team members witnessed incidents of armed attacks on the elections. Notably attacks in Sapele town at 130pm Thursday and Warri south (external reports) were widely noted. There were also credible repeated local reports of 'sporadic shooting' and posturing intended to intimidate voters.
At the collation of results the INEC Chairman complained over the conduct of politicians and INEC staff have also complained publicly of being assaulted.
Turnout
The massively inflated results in previous elections that have clashed with visibly low turnouts have been one of the crucial issues affecting their credibility. The Anambra re-run election held in February 2009 is a useful reference point as a difficult election held under significant security precautions produced a low turnout and results that reflected what was observed.
The turnout in the Delta re-run was inevitably going to be suppressed by a number of factors that also included the exclusion of voters who do not have to hand their temporary or permanent voters registration card.
Results
The early results declared at the polling units observed by SDN in both Asaba and Warri environs were encouraging in that they seemed to reflect actual voting and were being publicly acknowledged as fair. Turnouts were typically around the 10% of registered voters level.
SDN observed Oshimili South LGA from poll unit announcements to completion at LGA headquarters and the results produced a local win for Ogboro by a moderate margin
Total reg voters 68,136.. DPP 2,811 PDP 2,460 Total Valid cast 5,768 (incl 236 rejected) - Turnout 8.5 %
The DPP candidate Great Ogboro was interviewed by AIT television saying that this was the first time [in civilian period] that people in his local government had been allowed to vote, and he went on to thank INEC for this as a significant leap forwards.
However after these early results there were a number of LGAs that brought back results that are worthy of concern. Typically they are coming from more remote “riverine” areas, and it should be acknowledged that these were expected to be PDP strongholds. However the turnouts appear to be starkly at odds with other results from the election.
At the time of writing the data is incomplete but Bomadi LGA is a fair example – Registered voters – 43,752.....DPP (Ogboro) 4,354... PDP.. 21,632.. Total Cast 27,070 (384 rejected) Turnout 61.8%
The INEC Chairman had earlier acknowledged that reports of ballot theft were true in some cases and this has resulted in some cancellations. However it is impossible to assess the detail of this at this stage as results being announced at INEC in Asaba are not providing Ward level detail as has normally occurred in previous elections.
Full results are being released in a number of places but the most concise online summary appears to be here:
http://www.enoughisenoughnigeria.com/blog/?p=758
It now appears certain that Emmanuel Uduaghan will win the re-run but with a significant cloud over the results.
At the time of writing results had been temporarily suspended as Great Ogboro and his supporters were reportedly protesting at the Asaba INEC Headquarters
RISKS OF VIOLENCE
There is a significant risk of post election violence and problems with whether the declared result will be accepted.
In many previous elections in the Niger Delta rigging has been met with an air of resignation by the population and little reaction has followed. In this case Ogboro clearly has supporters across the state who are strongly engaged and based on early results and incidents through the election they feel strongly that the election has been seriously compromised.
The protest led by Ogboro may be followed by wider action and potentially violence from youths who were already noticeably angry at telltale signs of rigging on the evening of Thursday 6th.
Additional security forces have been observed moving into Warri on Friday morning and it is anticipated that tensions will continue.
CONCLUSIONS
The limited information on results makes some of the following conclusions tentative.
INEC has conducted an election where there was a significantly improved effort to conduct a poll and have votes credibly counted. In a significant number of LGAs this appears to have occurred and it sets a significant precedent after almost 8 years of routinely rigged elections.
The participation by the public while producing low turnout numbers in results seems to reflect a recovery in interest in voting after the disastrous 2007 elections effectively destroyed public participation. Both INEC and the public at large deserve credit for this.
However this vital progress will be offset by the controversy over results in other LGAs and their impact on the overall result of the election. The questions over wild variations in recorded turnout deserve a credible and immediate investigation.
INEC must move to reassure voters and the public by following up on its pledges to investigate and prosecute election abuse. Its handling of the inevitable appeal process where laws demand greater neutrality and access to information will also be important to retaining credibility ahead of the main 2011 polls.
There appear to be clear allegations against prominent individuals participating directly in rigging and violence. All of the authorities and INEC must act swiftly on these cases to provide assurance that the era of impunity over electoral abuse is over.
SDN and CEHRD will complete a more detailed observation report within the next week.
For more information please contact:
Patrick Naagbanton, CEHRD Ph 0803 336 7823 naagbanton.patrick@ymail.com
Inemo Samiama (SDN) Ph 0703 375 1788 inemo@stakeholderdemocracy.org


