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A Background to the Niger Delta Conflict

The current conflict in the Niger Delta is driven by a powerful mixture of corruption, underdevelopment, poverty and violence. Low intensity inter- and intra-ethnic conflicts on a local scale have always been part of life in the Niger Delta. However, the vast wealth available to those who control the power structures of the state and the increasing polarisation of society has led to a significant shift in the underlying conflict dynamic. Oil companies have been accused of increasing this conflict dynamics by favouring host communities over others and making direct payments to the most troublesome elements in society to maintain peace in the short term. The failure by all stakeholders to address the underlying causes of the conflict and to opt for long term solutions has pushed the Niger Delta to the brink of an internationally important conflict.

The peaceful clamour for change and justice to be delivered to the population of the Niger Delta was led throughout the 1990 by the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP). Headed by Ken Saro Wiwa, the Ogoni struggle received international attention. When Ken Saro Wiwa was hanged, on the 10th November 1995, with eight other Ogoni activists, the world responded with collective condemnation. This peaceful action for change continues to date in the Niger Delta but is perceived by many as having not delivered. Therefore violence seems to be a more attractive and acceptable option for many of today's disengaged youth.

The first real heightening of the conflict dynamic occurred in Warri in 1997 and continued for on and off until 2003. This tri-ethnic conflict cost thousands of lives, immense human suffering and extensive loss to material investment. It laid the foundation for many of the militant groups that now dominate the conflict in the Niger Delta.

The 2003 electoral campaign marked a significant change in the dynamics of the conflict. The use of political thugs to secure the 2003 election resulted in the rise of the first seriously recognised militia group calling for substantive restructuring of the Niger Delta society and removal of the oil companies. After the 2003 electoral campaign most militia groups felt that their illegal activities, ranging from illegal oil bunkering, through kidnapping of oil industry workers to illegal arms smuggling, have been given a sort of "legitimacy" or even impunity by the state elites. Many of them also felt that because they had brought certain politicians to power, those owed them something in return and where the expected rewards were not coming, they started to feel resentful. One of them was Dokubo Asari who betrayed his political paymaster and created the Niger Delta Peoples Volunteer Force (NDPVF). The international prominence of this group grew as they declared "all-out war" on the Nigerian state and threatened the western oil infrastructure demanding that all oil companies evacuate their personnel from the Delta or prepare to engage in armed combat. This helped in September 2004 to increase the global oil prices to over the unheralded then $50 per barrel. Throughout 2004 the NDPVF fought not only the state security forces but the right wing Niger Delta Vigilante Services (NDVS) headed by Ateke Tom, a self-confessed political thug. The conflict between these two groups directly claimed hundreds of lives.

2005 witnessed an increase in the boldness and intensity of militia groups to inflict damage to the oil industry and the State. The arrest of Asari was followed by the rise of a new militia: the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND). Since January 2006 the latest wave of violence has resulted in at least 4 kidnappings a month and numerous battles between the state security services and militia groups, increasing the pervading sense in society that the conflict will steadily increase. The result of this violence has not only been huge toll on the lives of the population it has had a significant impact on world oil prices locking in 900,000 bpd.

The response to this mounting conflict to date has been buying off the leaders of violence at a local and regional level. This approach has failed and will continue to fail because for every individual that is bought off there are 20 others ready to take his place and commit a greater level of violence in order to justify their own pay off. This can not continue if thousands of lives are not to be lost.

It is believed that the conflict is costing over 1500 deaths a year which places it in the same UN category as Chechnya or Colombia.