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Background to Governance of the Delta

Nigeria's return to democracy in 1999 heralded a potentially monumental transformation of the political patronage system. Lives of many activists had been lost in the fight against military control and with the comparatively democratic election of 1999 civil society was filled with much hope for not only the future of Nigeria but the sustainable development of the Niger Delta. This hope has proven short-lived and it was even claimed, by a minority, 'that things had been better under military rule'. At least then the government could not hide behind the veil of 'democracy'. After the 1999 electoral process the momentum behind civil activism that aided the transition to democracy was somewhat lost. Developmental funds began to flow from the US and Europe and people realised and accepted that democracy would take time to deliver. What that time has meant so far and this is why the population of the Niger Delta is so angry, is a continuation of elite patronage based politics at the expense of the men, women, and children on the streets and the dilapidated farms. Just to add insult to their fate, the international community is perceived to support a supposed democratic regime when the citizens of the Niger Delta know well that since 1999 the political direction their states are heading in is anything but democratic.

The primary driver of conflict in the Niger Delta is the systematic failure of the Nigerian government to utilise the revenue generated through oil production for the good of the people. The resultant poverty of the majority of the population is only dwarfed in seriousness by the excesses of the state elites. This disparity between the majority and minority is the direct result of endemic corruption, the 'chopping' of funds, that should have been used to benefit all. This visible disparity thrust into the faces of the majority on a daily bases, is a very serious conflict escalator in the Niger Delta. The outcome of this failing by the state is a long history of broken promises and removal of the social contract between the state and the majority of its citizens in the Niger Delta. Reinforcing the demise of the social contract is the belief that politicians from outside the 'South-South' zone of Nigeria have developed Abuja on the back of the oil wealth, while continuing to forget and, more importantly, not care about the fate of the Niger Delta. The wealth and potential for future revenue generation that does exist in the Niger Delta is a worrying aspect to the conflict dynamic. The resources necessary to fund and sustain a high level conflict are readily available.

The population of the Niger Delta perceives that, because they are not composed of a majority unifying ethnic group, they have been marginalised since independence. Their developmental needs, as originally highlighted by the Wilkins Commission at the end of the colonial era, have never been addressed. Abandoned and subdued by successive military junctures it was hoped, but not expected, that democracy might finally deliver development to the population of the Niger Delta. However, little has changed and some commentators even suggested that things had been better under military rule. It was generally believed that the current 13 per cent derivation that the South-South states receive of the oil wealth was not enough to address the decades of neglect faced by the population of the Niger Delta and some felt it was an insult. However, what is crucial here is that all believed that if this 13 per cent was spent wisely and the governments at the state and local level no longer enriched themselves at the expense of the people, then this amount would go a long way in reversing the plight of the Delta.

It can be assumed with some confidence that the continued poverty of the Niger Delta is primarily due to the failings of the Nigerian state and this poverty is the key to the expected upsurge in violence. The violence rapidly developing in the Niger Delta is said to be a final cry for voice based on a well thought through argument that things have to change, because people have simply had enough: they are pushed to the wall. This feeling of being pushed to the wall has resulted in individuals being drawn to support local ethnic and conservative groups as the majority reinforce their attachments to those in society to whom they feel the closest. This has resulted in a complex web of local conflict dynamics, that, if ignited, would be catastrophic for the Niger Delta. Just as the violence in the Niger Delta is primarily down to political failings and the resultant poverty, the answers to the conflict dynamic also exist within the state.

SDN believes that civil society has a central role to play in the creation of sustainably developing societies impacted by extractive industries. Government actors are direct beneficiaries of the 'paradox of plenty' and do not need to champion and respond to the needs of their most vulnerable citizens. SDN believes that civil society is central to breaking this patrimonial cycle. Therefore, SDN works to improve the capacity, profile and networking outreach of credible local civil society actors. Together, this work enables the key desires and grievances of the grassroots to be directly addressed.